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Abstract 
Traditionally, corporate governance debates have contrasted models based on the principle of 
shareholder primacy with others taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, such as 
organised labour. The chapter argues that a new corporate governance compromise is emerging, 
particularly in Europe, driven by responsible investors, civil society and organised labour, which 
might offer a new way of overcoming the shareholder versus stakeholder dispute. This emerging 
NGOs-Investor-Union (NIU) nexus is illustrated using various examples of recent regulatory 
initiatives: the EU Non-financial Reporting Directive; the Dutch Banking Sector Agreement regarding 
human rights; the UK Modern Slavery Act and the French Law on the ‘duty of vigilance’. The chapter 
draws on the abovementioned cases to elaborate some conjectures on the implications and 
limitations of this dynamic and fragile convergence of interests for policy-makers and existing 
debates on sustainable corporate governance reforms.  
Keywords: Corporate Sustainability; EU Regulation; Non-Financial Reporting; Modern Slavery; 
Corporate Governance; Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance debates conventionally contrast models based on the principle of shareholder 
primacy with others taking into account the interests of other stakeholders, such as organised labour 
and local communities. This chapter argues that this binary division is harmful for corporate 
sustainability and both shareholder-oriented and multi-stakeholder models are overly idealistic, de-
politicized and under-socialized. Instead, I propose a more dynamic, processual and contested 
approach to corporate sustainability regulation. Empirically, I investigate the driving forces behind a 
recent wave of reforms that have emerged in Europe at different levels of governance, aimed at 
strengthening corporate social and environmental sustainability. They include the EU Non-financial 
Reporting Directive; the Dutch Banking Sector Agreement regarding human rights; the UK Modern 
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Slavery Act and the French Law on the ‘duty of vigilance’.1 On the basis of extensive research 
conducted between 2010 and 2017, the study reveals the emergence of a new sustainable corporate 
governance compromise in Europe driven by ‘hybrid’ shareholder-stakeholder coalitions of civil 
society, responsible investors and organised labour. Thus, I refer to this dynamic and fragile 
convergence of interests as the NGOs-Investor-Union (NIU) nexus.2 Their strategic policy alignment is 
mainly aimed at holding large corporations more accountable for financial, environmental and social 
risks related to global supply chain governance. This compromise might offer a way of overcoming 
the shareholder - stakeholder divide. Scope conditions and policy implications for developing a 
stronger approach to corporate sustainability are discussed.  
Consistent with the approach adopted by this Handbook, I define sustainable corporate governance 
regulation as a process aimed at developing and enforcing a set of corporate rules and governance 
principles that do not only or mainly satisfy economic needs but also have the objective of a) 
ensuring the long-term stability and resilience of the ecosystems that support human life and b) 
facilitating the respect and promotion of human rights and other basic social rights.   
The chapter is organised as follows. The following section contextualises this contribution in the 
existing corporate governance policy debate. Section 3 briefly discusses the research methodology, 
data collection and analysis. Section 4 offers an analysis of findings, focusing on the emergence of a 
recent wave of sustainable corporate governance reforms in Europe. Section 5 discusses policy 
implications and scope conditions. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Theoretical motivations  
This section argues that the two main approaches that have dominated the European corporate 
governance debate since the mid-1990s, the shareholder-oriented3 and multi-stakeholder models,4 
                                                          
1
 Other chapters in this volume have addressed these reforms. See in particular I. H-Y Chiu, ‘Disclosure 
Regulation and Sustainability’, Ch. 37; A. Johnston, ‘Market-led sustainability through information disclosure: 
the UK’s approach’, Ch. 15; J. Zhao, ‘Extraterritorial Attempts at Addressing Challenges to Corporate 
Sustainability’, Ch. 3; C. Villiers, ‘Global supply chains and sustainability: the role of disclosure and due 
diligence laws’, Ch. 40; Van der Elst and Lafarre, ‘Corporate sustainability and shareholder activism in the 
Netherlands’, Ch. 19; and Magnier, ‘Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability in France: An 
innovative old-fashioned model of governance’, Ch. 20. 
2
 See also D. Monciardini, ‘The “Coalition of the Unlikely” Driving the EU Regulatory Process of Non-Financial 
Reporting.’ (2016) 36 Social and Environmental Accountability Journal 1, 76-89; D. Monciardini and G. Conaldi, 
‘The European regulation of corporate social responsibility: The role of beneficiaries' intermediaries’ (2019) 
13(2) Regulation & Governance, 240-259. 
3
 R., Porta, F. Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer, R. W. Vishny, ‘Legal determinants of external finance’ (1997) 52 The 
Journal of Finance, 3, 1131-1150. 
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are equally inadequate to advance sustainable corporate governance and should be abandoned. 
Instead, I advance a more processual, contingent and dynamic approach to corporate sustainability 
regulation that takes into account temporality and structural power relationships. 
2.1 Stakeholder versus shareholders: Ideal perspectives on corporate sustainability regulation  
 
Until the mid-1990s, European corporate policies were based on the historical compromise between 
labour and capital that emerged after the Second World War. This model of corporate governance 
was characterized by mechanisms such as collective bargaining and the tripartite coordination of 
government, industry and unions.5 While elements of this model are still in place both at the 
national and EU levels, since that time the European corporate policy and regulatory debate has 
developed in two different directions, leaning toward either a shareholder-oriented or a multi-
stakeholder approach.  
Some studies have pointed out that European company law and corporate governance rules have 
become increasingly financialized, converging towards the shareholder-oriented model.6 This 
approach is underpinned by the mainstream version of ‘agency theory’ that understands corporate 
governance regulation as primarily focused on holding company executives (agents) accountable to 
shareholders (principals).7 Taking this view, the main responsibility of managers is to maximize 
shareholders’ returns – also known as ‘shareholder value maximization’. The role of policy-makers is 
to address possible regulatory failures related, in particular, to asymmetric information between 
principals and agents. Therefore, EU corporate governance policies have strengthened mandatory 
financial disclosure based on harmonized International Accounting Standards (IAS), arguably making 
it increasingly aligned to the information needs of transnational financial markets.8 Social and 
environmental matters are taken into account only to the extent that they are financially relevant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4
 R.E. Freeman, ‘Stakeholder management: framework and philosophy.’ (Pitman: Mansfield, MA, 1984): L. 
Sacconi, ‘A social contract account for CSR as an extended model of corporate governance (I): Rational 
bargaining and justification’ (1984) 68 Journal of Business Ethics, 3, 259-281. 
5
 See M. Regini ‘Social Pacts in the EC Report on Industrial Relations in Europe’ in M. Biagi (ed.) Towards a 
European Model of Industrial Relations? : Building on the First Report of the European Commission (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
6
 C. A., Williams and P., Zumbansen (eds.), The Embedded Firm: corporate governance, labour, and finance 
capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
7
 M.C., Jensen and W. H., Meckling,’ Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership 
structure (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 4, 305-360; E.F., Fama, ‘Agency problems and the theory of 
the firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy, 2, 288-307. 
8
 See I. Dewing and P. Russell, ’The role of private actors in global governance and regulation: US, European 
and international convergence of accounting and auditing standards in a post-Enron world’ in H. Overbeek, B. 
Van Apeldoorn and A. Nolke (eds.) The transnational politics of corporate governance regulation (N.Y: 
Routledge, 2007). 
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Notably, EU corporate sustainability policies are becoming increasingly focused on sustainable 
finance as a means to achieve a more environmentally and socially responsible economy.9  
Other stakeholders, such as workers, have been marginalised from corporate governance policy 
debates and their concerns are largely framed through voluntary multi-stakeholder initiatives, such 
as the Global Reporting Initiative or the Forest Stewardship Council. European policy-makers have 
actively promoted voluntary initiatives to enhance corporate responsibility and accountability, on 
the basis of generic arguments for the inclusion of societal interests or stakeholder groups.10 While 
the agency theory view is very clear in identifying shareholders as the only or main group of actors 
to which managers are accountable, multi-stakeholder initiatives are deliberately open to all 
stakeholders and relatively ill-defined. The intended beneficiaries of these initiatives may include 
customers, workers, and local communities where businesses operate but also the ‘global 
environment’ or the ‘global common good’.11   
While the shareholder-oriented model has been widely criticised for taking a narrow, short-term 
approach to corporate governance,12 the multi-stakeholder approach is conventionally considered a 
better alternative to promote corporate sustainability. For instance, calls for a multi-stakeholder 
approach to corporate regulation are central to both the ‘new governance’ approach proposed by 
John Ruggie13 and the ‘political CSR’ literature closely associated with Habermas’ concept of 
deliberative democracy.14 However, a growing literature challenges the effectiveness of this model,15 
arguing that voluntary and market-driven multi-stakeholder initiatives neglect asymmetric interests 
and structural power relationships. Observing that many initiatives have failed and were captured by 
corporate interests,16 they dismiss the deliberative and democratic multi-stakeholder ideal as overly 
                                                          
9
 See in particular the EU comprehensive sustainable finance strategy and action plan. For more information: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finance_en 
10
 O. de Schutter, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility European Style’, (2008) 14 European Law Journal, 203–236. 
11
 M-L Djelic and H. Etchanchu, ‘Contextualizing corporate political responsibilities: Neoliberal CSR in historical 
perspective’ (2017) 142 Journal of Business Ethics 4, 641-661 
12
 L.A. Stout, The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms investors, corporations, and 
the public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012); Williams and Zumbansen, The Embedded Firm. 
13
 J. G. Ruggie,  ‘Global governance and “new governance theory”: Lessons from business and human rights’ 
(2014) 20 Global Governance 1, 5-17. 
14
 AG. Scherer  and G. Palazzo, ‘The new political role of business in a globalized world: A review of a new 
perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance, and democracy’ (2011) 48 Journal of 
Management Studies, 899-931. 
15
 R. Shamir, ‘The De-radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2004) 30 Critical Sociology 3, 669-689; J, 
Mäkinen and A, Kourula, ‘Pluralism in Political Corporate Social Responsibility’, (2012) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 22, 649-678; Salles-Djelic and Etchanchu Contextualizing corporate political responsibilities. 
16
 For instance see S. Moog, A. Spicer S. Böhm, ‘The Politics of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: the Crisis of the 
Forest Stewardship Council’ (2015) 128 Journal of Business Ethics 3, 469-493. 
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optimistic, claiming that this approach is ineffective and ultimately harmful. Rather than advancing 
human rights and environmental protection, it enhances corporate power and legitimacy. 
This chapter maintains that both the shareholder-oriented and multi-stakeholder models are 
inadequate and idealistic approaches to sustainable corporate governance and should be discarded. 
Both models are ultimately de-politicised and under-socialized abstractions. They both respond to 
the need for market-driven regulation of global corporations that characterises the contemporary 
neoliberal understanding of corporate ‘responsibility’ or ‘accountability’.17 Crucially, both models 
have been criticized for being ineffective in realizing sustainable corporate governance as they do 
not work in practice.18 As Salles-Djelic and Etchanchu noted,19 the real winners in contemporary 
neoliberal corporate governance arrangements are neither shareholders nor stakeholders but the 
executives of large multinational enterprises that enjoy unprecedented levels of managerial 
discretion, especially when it comes to global value chains.20  
2.2 Towards a processual and dynamic approach to corporate sustainability regulation 
In contrast with the shareholder primacy and multi-stakeholder corporate governance ideals, I 
propose a more contextual, processual and dynamic perspective to explain some recent sustainable 
corporate governance reforms in Europe. Building on existing corporate governance and CSR 
research,21 the approach has four distinctive and intertwined characteristics. 
                                                          
17
 Salles-Djelic and Etchanchu Contextualizing corporate political responsibilities. 
18
 S. Soederberg, Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The Politics of Resistance and 
Domination (London:  Routledge/ RIPE Series in Global Political Economy 2010), 6; P. Fleming The end of 
corporate social responsibility: Crisis and critique (Sage 2012). 
19
 Salles-Djelic and Etchanchu Contextualizing corporate political responsibilities. 
20
 For instance, see S. Barrientos, ‘Contract labour: The ‘Achilles heel’ of corporate codes in commercial value 
chains’ (2008) 39 Development and Change 6, 977-990. 
21
 This approach builds on the work of various scholars, including C. Crouch, ‘Modelling the firm in its market 
and organizational environment: Methodologies for studying corporate social responsibility’ (2006) 27 
Organization Studies 10, 1533-1551; P. Ireland and RG Pillay, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal 
Age’ In P. Utting and J Marques (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance (Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2010), 77-104. P. A. Gourevitch and J. Shinn, Political power and corporate control: The new 
global politics of corporate governance (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2005); H. Overbeek, B. Van 
Apeldoorn and A. Nolke (Eds.), The transnational politics of corporate governance regulation (N.Y: Routledge 
2007); S. Brammer, G. Jackson, D. Matten, ‘Corporate social responsibility and institutional theory: New 
perspectives on private governance’ (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review, 1, 3-28; D. Levy,, J. Reinecke,, , S. 
Manning, ‘The political dynamics of sustainable coffee: Contested value regimes and the transformation of 
sustainability’ (2016) 53 Journal of Management Studies 3, 364-401; Djelic and Etchanchu, ‘Contextualizing 
corporate political responsibilities’. 
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First, this approach stresses the importance of temporality. Current conceptions of corporate 
governance and responsibilities have been criticized for overlooking history and institutions.22 By 
taking a process perspective,23 I encourage a more contextual understanding of the interactions 
between business and civil society, capital providers, regulators, organized labour and other groups 
of actors relevant to a specific political and institutional arena. Rather than applying a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ model of corporate sustainability policies, this approach conceptually builds our understanding 
on the ‘social, material, spatio-temporal relations among economic and extra-economic activities, 
institutions and systems and their encompassing civil society.’24  
Second, both the shareholder-oriented and multi-stakeholder models are constructed on the idea 
that corporate governance aims to eliminate conflicts and tensions (between principal and agent or 
amongst stakeholders). Both sustainable finance and multi-stakeholder initiatives emphasise a win-
win-win rhetoric. Eventually, sustainability will benefit all the parties involved and generate a triple 
bottom line that takes into account people, planet and profits. Against this depoliticized perspective, 
classic sociologists like Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser already suggested that conflict can be a very 
positive social force that prevents stagnation, stimulates learning and the search for new solutions.25 
Building on this tradition, conflicts should not be treated as a ‘negative’ but as a ‘variable’ that can 
help to forge and test norms and rules and articulate successful bargains and negotiations. 
Specifically, in the context of this analysis, conflicts and coalitions are not opposite poles but rather 
structurally linked, constructive elements of social change dimensions. 
Third and relatedly, coalitions of actors are not pre-defined according to divisions between business 
and civil society or other aprioristic distinctions. Deploying a more dynamic approach, they emerge 
as part of an ‘extended, interactive and somewhat unpredictable process’.26 Rather than having a 
model through which real-world struggles, contestations and representations are ordered and 
assessed, this study suggests that business, investors and NGOs deploy a broad range of corporate 
sustainability tactics that go beyond unyielding divisions.  
                                                          
22
 Ireland and Pillay; Marens etc; Kinderman; Brammer, Stephen, Gregory Jackson, and Dirk Matten. 
"Corporate social responsibility and institutional theory: New perspectives on private governance." Socio-
economic review 10.1 (2012): 3-28. Salles-Djelic and Etchanchu;  
23
 See Levy, Reinecke and Manning, ‘The political dynamics of sustainable coffee’. 
24
 B. Jessop, ‘Cultural political economy and critical political studies’ (2010), Critical Political Studies, 3, 336-56: 
348. 
25
 G. Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-affiliations (NY: Free Press 1955); L. Coser, The Functions of Social 
Conflict (NY: The Free Press 1956). 
26
 Levy, Reinecke and Manning, ‘The political dynamics of sustainable coffee’, p. 368. 
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Finally, public authorities and lawmakers are currently marginalized in corporate governance 
debates. In the shareholder model, the central stage belongs to shareholders and executives. In 
multi-stakeholder models they are formally equalized with any other stakeholder. Against these 
views, this perspective underlines what Bourdieu called the special linguistic and social power of 
public authorities and lawmakers ‘to do things with words’.27 Essentially, the law-making process 
should be seen as the site of struggles for the definition of meaning and categories that are 
formalized and become widely accepted. A case in point is the influential definition of CSR given in 
2001 by the European Commission as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders 
on a voluntary basis’.28 By defining CSR as voluntary, EU policy-makers heavily shaped shared 
meaning and practices and legitimized a market-driven and narrow approach. Only ten years later, 
the European Commission redefined CSR as ‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society’, stressing that respecting applicable legislation is a prerequisite for meeting that 
responsibility.29 
3. Case studies, methods and data collection 
Consistent with this emphasis on temporality and processual dynamics, this study adopted a 
‘process theory’ perspective to investigate empirically changes in the European regime of 
sustainable corporate governance regulation.30 This research methodology gives particular attention 
to time ordering of the contributory events as a way of capturing the key factors that explain the 
role of different actors in shaping policy and regulatory changes. The research strategy consists of a 
‘causal reconstruction’, linking initial conditions to observable outcomes.31   
Sustainable corporate governance regulation can take different forms. I will focus on European 
regulation – both EU and national – related to transparency and reporting for three reasons. First, 
reporting has a special place because it is one of the few areas of mandatory sustainable corporate 
governance regulation. Second, European public regulation in this area is on the rise and recent 
                                                          
27
 P Bourdieu, ‘The force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field’, (1986) Hastings Law Journal 38, 805. 
28
 European Commission, Green Paper—Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
COM(2001) 366 (Bruxelles, European Commission, 2001).  
29
 European Commission, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2011) 681 
(Bruxelles, European Commission, 2011). 
30
 A. Langley ‘Strategies for theorizing from process data’ (1999) 24 Academy of Management Review 4, 691-
710; Levy, Reinecke and Manning, ‘The political dynamics of sustainable coffee’. 
31
 R. Mayntz, ‘Mechanisms in the analysis of social macro-phenomena’ (2004) 34 Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 2, 237-259 
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changes call for renewed attention to the role of public regulation.32 Finally, transparency rules can 
be seen as a ‘first port’33 for broader changes in the governance of corporations, as it implicitly 
outlines the division of rights and responsibilities among civil society, states and market actors and 
some of the means for achieving them.34   
Deploying an inductive approach, I have initially identified the key actors in the dynamics of 
sustainable corporate governance through analysis of the data, particularly using EU and Member 
States’ official policies and documents as well as documents produced by various interest groups. 
Rather than being an aprioristic decision, our analytical framework has gradually emerged from the 
data collection through an iterative process. Raw data were linked to aggregate categories and 
themes by means of coding while theoretical insights gradually emerged in a continuous interaction 
between data and existing literature.35 
The data collection took place between 2010 and 2017, and the research covers the period from 
2000 to 2016. It is based on three main sources of data: 
1) A content analysis of the responses received by the EU Commission in two public consultations 
held in 2011 and 2016 concerning the construction and adoption of the EU Directive on non-financial 
reporting. The data were used to understand the position and roles of the different actors in the 
sustainable corporate governance regulatory field and helped to structure some preliminary 
hypotheses on the connections between different groups of actors and their policy preferences. This 
analysis confirmed the key role played by the NIU nexus in the recent wave of sustainable corporate 
governance reforms.  
2) Forty-two semi-structured, in-depth interviews with NGOs, responsible investors, unions, experts 
and regulators completed in two phases: 20 interviews (2010-2013) and 22 interviews (2016-2017) 
(see the Annex for the list of all interviews). In particular, the interviews have offered insights about 
behind-the-scenes informal relations between the groups of actors; their internal organisation; and 
their role in the construction of various sustainable corporate governance reforms. 
                                                          
32
 JS. Knudsen, J. Moon, R. Slager, ‘Government policies for corporate social responsibility in Europe: A 
comparative analysis of institutionalisation’ (2015) Policy & Politics 43, 81-99. 
33
 Interview#10 
34
 P. Newell, ‘Civil Society, Corporate Accountability and the Politics of Climate Change’, (2008) 8 Global 
Environmental Politics 3, 122-153. 
35
 B. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ (Chicago: Aldine 1967). For a more detailed 
account see Monciardini and Conaldi, ‘The European regulation of corporate social responsibility’. 
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3) A longitudinal qualitative content analysis of documents that cover the period 2000-2016. Some 
of the documents were provided by the interviewees, while others are publicly available (press 
releases, records, publications). The document analysis has provided a detailed understanding of 
cumulative institutional changes and a better comprehension of the interplay between different 
groups of actors in shaping the regulatory process.  
4. Findings: The emergent NGO-Investor-Union nexus  
This section empirically addresses the research question focusing, as an example, on a cross-section 
of recent sustainable corporate governance reforms that have emerged in Europe at different levels 
of regulation and through varying modes of governance. First, at the EU level, I consider the forces 
driving the emergence of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive. Then I explore the situation at the 
Member States level, focusing on three important reforms: the 2017 French Law on the ‘duty of 
vigilance’; the 2016 Dutch Banking Sector Agreement on international responsible business conduct 
regarding human rights; and the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act. 36  
The data show that all these reforms have been driven by ‘hybrid’ coalitions including some groups 
of shareholders and some groups of stakeholders. More specifically, this regulatory change has been 
driven by what I call the NIU nexus, a strategic convergence of interest between some NGOs (N), 
responsible investors (I) and trade unions (U).37 The research suggests that these emergent 
sustainable corporate governance coalitions are mainly aimed at holding managers of large 
corporations more financially, environmentally and socially accountable for growing risks related to 
supply chain governance. The convergence between the three groups of actors is particularly strong 
in the areas of transparency regulation and benchmarking.38  
4.1 Drivers of the EU non-financial reporting directive 
The EU Directive 2014/95/EU ( ‘the Directive’) requires all large public-interest companies with more 
than 500 employees to provide information about their policies, risks and outcomes regarding 
environmental matters, social and employee aspects, human rights, anti-corruption and bribery, and 
diversity. This applies to over 6,000 European companies and includes listed companies, banks, and 
                                                          
36
 See Ch. 19 and Ch. 20.  
37
 Monciardini and Conaldi, ‘The European regulation of corporate social responsibility’; see also Monciardini, 
‘The ‘Coalition of the Unlikely’. 
38
 This element was already identified by previous conceptualizations of this alignment – such as the 
‘transparency coalition’ studied by Gourevitch  and Shinn, Political power and corporate control. However this 
was very much focusing on the US political-economic environment characterised by active institutional 
investors. This was also not including NGOs but focusing on the investor-labour convergence. 
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insurers. Following its adoption by the European Parliament and the Council in 2014, all EU Member 
States have transposed the Directive into national legislation. The entities that fall within the scope 
of this new EU regulation have to apply it starting from the financial years beginning on or after 1 
January 2017. 
The legislative process that led to the adoption of the Directive has been very long – starting in 2011 
– and contested,39 due in particular to the strenuous opposition of BusinessEurope, the influential 
association of European employers. They claimed sustainability reporting should be a voluntary 
practice and that the Directive would create an additional ‘administrative burden’ making European 
companies less competitive in a period of crisis.40 While such opposition is not particularly 
surprising,41 the data analysis suggests that this reform was possible due to the alignment between 
the interests of three main groups of actors: various small and large NGOs, coordinated at the EU 
level by the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ); the European Sustainable Investment 
Forums (EUROSIF), the pan-European network of long-term, sustainable investors; and the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). They managed to exploit the narrow ‘window of opportunity’ 
opened by the 2008 global financial crisis to push for this accounting reform. The data show that 
ECCJ and Eurosif engaged in countless meetings, initiatives, workshops, press releases and 
collaborations aimed at moving the Directive up in the EU agenda and overcoming pure voluntarism 
(e.g. ECCJ 2010; Eurosif 2009). Notably, they initially lobbied the Commission separately. However, 
around 2011 they joined forces and involved also ETUC in their collaboration. According to the 
interviewees, this broader coalition was not planned. It emerged over time due to ‘affinity’ and 
‘communalities’42 because ‘we add to each other’s business case and we lobby for the same idea’.43 
According to the coordinator of ECCJ, during the process of developing the Directive he was 
‘regularly in touch’ with the director of Eurosif. They ‘managed to easily exchange information, share 
contacts with MEPs, invite each other to some of the key meetings.’ He concluded ‘investors became 
very helpful for NGOs and unions because they are the ones that are in between civil society and 
business.’44 Ultimately, although the final version of the Directive is a compromise and presents 
                                                          
39
 Monciardini, ‘The ‘Coalition of the Unlikely’’. 
40
 DP, Kinderman, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU, 1993–2013: Institutional Ambiguity, Economic 
Crises, Business Legitimacy and Bureaucratic Politics’ (2013) 51 JCMS 4, 701-720; DP Kinderman, ‘Time for a 
Reality Check: Is Business Willing to Support a Smart Mix of Complementary Regulation in Private 
Governance?’, (2016) 35 Policy & Society 1, 29-42. 
41
 Fairbrass, ‘Exploring corporate social responsibility policy in the European Union’. 
42
 interview#18 
43
 interview#30 
44
 interview#26 
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various limitations,45 what matters for the scope of this study is the pattern created by the unlikely 
success of the NIU nexus in influencing EU policy-makers. It is remarkable that this strategical 
convergence had a substantial effect on the regulatory process and outcome, despite the powerful 
opposition of BusinessEurope and its members.  
The centrality of responsible investors and NGOs in the regulatory process is confirmed by several 
interviews with policy-makers. For instance, one EC official affirmed, ‘NGOs have been very vocal 
with us, especially in the initial phase. We found them very helpful.’ Additionally, ‘I think the 
investors were key drivers for this.… We considered the fact that investors are discussing this as one 
of the key evidence that the market was demanding for increased transparency.’46 This is a major 
change as compared to previous EU policy debates when unions and organized civil society had 
failed to obtain mandatory disclosure of information related to the environmental and human rights 
impact of large business organizations.47 
The effectiveness of NGOs, responsible investors and unions in obtaining the adoption of the 
Directive was somewhat surprising even for them. They have traditionally struggled in the EU 
agenda setting and negotiation process ‘because they can put less money and resources in it’ 
compared to large companies’ representatives like BusinessEurope.48 However, NGOs, unions and 
responsible investors have managed to overcome their relatively limited organisational capabilities 
by joining forces. The interviews and documents provide abundant evidence that from 2011 to 2014 
they started to increasingly collaborate to counteract the powerful opposition to the Directive and 
exert greater influence over EU policy-makers.  
Crucially, this collaboration only began in 2011 after the EU Commission (1) opened the regulatory 
process to all stakeholders, beyond the narrow focus on companies and investors taken before the 
2008 financial crisis; and (2) took a more interventionist economic approach and announced a 
legislative proposal on sustainability reporting,49 following the appointment of Michel Barnier as 
Internal Market Commissioner.  
                                                          
45
 D. Monciardini, 'Regulating Accounting for Sustainable Companies: Some Considerations on the Forthcoming 
EU Directive' (2014) 11 European Company Law, Issue 2, pp. 121–124; C Villiers and J. Mähönen, Article 11: 
Integrated Reporting or Non-Financial Reporting? in B. Sjafjell and A. Wiesbrock (eds) The Greening of 
European Business under EU Law: Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously (Routledge, 2014,. 118-143). 
46
 interview#13 
47
 Fairbrass, ‘Exploring corporate social responsibility policy in the European Union’ 
48
 Interview#13 
49
 See, for instance, the ‘Single Market Act II: twelve priority actions for new growth’ adopted in 2012 by the 
EU Commission. 
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The sudden urge for this collaboration came in 2011-12, a period when the EC proposal on non-
financial reporting was stalled for several months.50 The representatives of the three constituencies 
– NGOs, responsible investors and unions – obtained a joint meeting with Commissioner Barnier to 
reiterate their support to the Commission’s initiative to address corporate transparency through 
legislation. The meeting was ‘a very key moment, because it really proved to trade unions and 
investors that this kind of collaboration could help us being very influential’.51 Coordination between 
the organizations intensified further as a consequence until the Directive was adopted in 2014. The 
data suggest that this collaboration – particularly the contribution of investors – has been crucial to 
shape the policy debate in a completely new direction, overcoming the argument that business did 
not want the Directive. As an EC official put it, ‘I think if I look at it objectively, one of the roles of the 
investors’ interest [in this reform] is to make it no longer a “black versus white” debate.… Then it is 
not simply the NGOs’ agenda. It becomes, if I am honest, an easier agenda to sell.’52 
Sections 5 and 6 will further discuss some of the scope conditions of the success obtained by the NIU 
nexus and possible implications for policy-makers.    
4.2 Corporate sustainability reforms in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
 
In the exploratory study of the constituencies driving recent sustainable corporate governance 
reforms in Europe, it soon emerged that the NIU nexus was not limited to the collaboration of ECCJ, 
ETUC and Eurosif at the EU level. Following formal and informal links between members of ECCJ 
(NGOs), ETUC (trade unions) and Eurosif (responsible investors), similar compromises are emerging 
also at the national level and have been equally influential in shaping corporate sustainability 
reforms.  
Through a series of interviews, we investigated 12 formal bonds between members of ECCJ, ETUC 
and Eurosif – this refers to specific national organisations that belong to multiple networks, e.g. both 
ETUC and Eurosif, or Eurosif and ECCJ. We found that they exist in Spain, France, the Netherlands 
and the UK. While a detailed outline and discussion of national varieties of the NIU nexus goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter, we present here the cases of France, the Netherlands and the UK 
to illustrate the ramifications and different forms of NIU coalitions. 
                                                          
50
 K. Bizzarri, ‘Business Hollows Out New EU Corporate Social Responsibility Rules’ (2013) Corporate Europe 
Observatory. 
51
 interview#26 
52
 Interview #14 
 13 
 
The French case mirrors some of the key features of the EU-level convergence outlined above for the 
Directive. Certainly, the NIU nexus was crucial to support the recent introduction of the law on the 
‘devoir de vigilance’.53 The law obliges large companies to monitor and prevent possible violations of 
human rights and environmental risks in their supply chains. As the Chair of the French Sustainable 
Investment Forum (FIR) revealed, FIR worked with trade unions and NGOs to promote this reform.  
The fact that we took a position that we’re in favour of this law, that we think it makes 
sense, did make a big difference and I think we had a big impact on that …. Obviously, the 
members of Parliament that were in favour of that particular law used the fact that they had 
FIR in their favour to say, ‘Look, this is not anti-business. We have people coming from 
business who say it’s good’.54 
Similarly to the EU Directive, the support of socially responsible investors was critical in overcoming 
one of the main obstacles that had been blocking these reforms in the past: employers could present 
them as an anti-business legislation. 
At the same time, an analysis of the membership of FIR as much as Eurosif, demonstrates how the 
conventional approach to investors – as rational economic actors merely interested in maximizing 
their financial returns – is misleading and too narrow.  
FIR effectively is a strange animal because it’s a multi-stakeholder organisation and we have 
around the table businesses, asset managers, investors, advisers …. And we also have NGOs 
and trade unions, etc.55  
Thus, organizations like FIR or Eurosif are key epistemic communities where the NIU nexus can 
elaborate a compromise position that combines investor perspectives with the different points of 
views of unions and NGOs. In addition, in the NIU compromise the responsible investor community 
operates as a bridge between purely social stakeholders and purely economic shareholders. In 
particular, it is able to translate human rights and environmental battles into the language of 
finance. 
In the Netherlands, this cooperation appears more structured and formalized. The Netherlands is 
the largest market for socially responsible investments in Europe, due to a consolidated tradition 
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and to the presence of very large occupational pension funds.56 In this situation, unions have played 
a crucial role in the establishment of the Dutch responsible investment movement as they have 
statutory representation in the board of these large pension funds. There is also a strong relation 
between NGOs and investors. For instance, VBDO, which is part of Eurosif and represents the main 
platform for responsible investors in the Netherlands, is also a member of the VMOPlatform, which 
is the Dutch member of ECCJ.  
Beyond these more formalized cross-affiliations, there are informal yet clear signs of a systemic 
approach to sustainable corporate governance built around the NIU compromise. In particular, as 
part of the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, the Dutch government has been 
active in facilitating the development of voluntary agreements on International Responsible Business 
Conduct between companies, NGOs and other partners at sector level. This approach is very 
different from conventional voluntary CSR as it is much more coordinated: it includes a negotiation 
between the parties under the auspices of the government.57 In this sense, it resembles the 
tripartite social dialogue that characterised European corporate regulation until the 1990s. The goal 
of the process is to reach an agreement that – within three-five years – would effectively avoid 
adverse effects of and improve circumstances for groups affected by specific human rights abuses 
(e.g. child labour, low wages, human rights violations or environmental pollution). Furthermore, it 
openly acknowledges the need for a collective solution to problems that businesses are unable to 
solve on their own. So far, agreements have already been concluded in several sectors including 
gold, garments and textiles. Possibly, the most important agreement was reached in the banking 
sector – after two years of tough negotiations.58 Similarly to the other cases discussed above, the 
driver for this sustainable corporate governance reform was an NIU compromise between the Dutch 
banks, trade unions, NGOs and the Dutch government. The aim has been to join forces on 
international responsible business conduct regarding human rights within the banking sector. The 
agreement was signed on 28 October 2017 and it entails the creation of a steering committee where 
government representatives from the Dutch Ministry of Finance and Foreign Affairs will run a 
negotiation with representatives from the banking sector, NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
trade unions. Notably, the agreement also includes the creation of a complaints and disputes 
mechanism administered by the steering committee. The parties and the adhering banks can 
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activate it in case of non-compliance by parties and/or adhering banks. Crucially, contrary to multi-
stakeholder initiatives that are often funded by corporations, all these activities are funded by the 
Dutch government. 
Finally, In the UK this NIU compromise is also well-established, driven by the combined presence of a 
large financial sector and major NGOs, such as Oxfam, E3G, and WWF. Unlike in the Netherlands, 
unions do not have a statutory role in occupational pension funds. However, according to my 
interviews, they have increasingly engaged in shareholder activity.59 As in the other cases, the NIU 
nexus is particularly strong in the areas of human rights risk management in supply chains.60 The 
interviews also suggest a strong common interest – particularly in the case of investors and NGOs – 
in tackling environmental issues.  
The NIU nexus has supported the adoption of important sustainable corporate governance 
legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act (2015).61 In relation to corporate transparency and 
accountability, Section 54 of the Act requires companies with an annual turnover above £36 million 
to produce a Slavery and Human Trafficking statement, indicating the steps they are taking to 
prevent modern slavery abuses in supply chains and operations. The Act requires companies to start 
publishing the statements by 30 September 2017. The statements are to be signed by a company 
director on behalf of the board and made available at a prominent place on the company’s website. 
The information contained in the statements include policies on modern slavery and human 
trafficking; identified risks of modern slavery and steps taken to mitigate the risks; staff training and 
capacity to tackle modern slavery and human trafficking. For instance, according to one NGO: 
There are different pieces of legislation in which we know that the conversation with 
investors has been important. It hasn’t always been successful.… on the UK Modern Slavery 
Act there was the positioning of Aviva as well as some other individual businesses, which 
came to be important and determinant in showing that legislation was not feared by  
businesses, that there were some that supported and were calling for it.62  
Also in the case of the UK Modern Slavery Act, one of the successful features of NIU compromises is 
its ability to overcome the divide between ‘business’ and ‘anti-business’; ‘social’ and ‘financial’.  If 
the responsible investor community is able to mobilize large mainstream investors like Aviva and 
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business organizations, this affects the policy debate and shows that there is a broad support for 
corporate sustainability reforms. 
5. Discussion: policy implications and scope conditions  
In this chapter I have explored the socio-economic constituencies driving a recent wave of corporate 
reforms that have emerged in Europe at different levels of regulation. I have maintained that they 
were driven by a little-studied convergence of shareholders and other groups of stakeholders: NGOs, 
responsible investors and unions. On the basis of this empirical study, I elaborate on some key 
implications for current policy debates on sustainable corporate governance, also offering some 
conjectures on the scope conditions of my findings.  
Policymakers should be cautious about rules and standards for sustainable corporate governance 
and accountability that are narrowly focused only on incentivizing or encouraging sustainable and 
green finance. Despite the lessons of the 2008 global financial crisis, the business rhetoric of 
shareholder primacy and value maximization is regaining currency. For instance, recently the EU has 
outlined a Sustainable Finance initiative63 that is mainly centred on the role of investors and the 
financial sector as the sole or main means to advance a low-carbon, more resource-efficient and 
sustainable economy. This narrower regulatory strategy risks limiting the emergence of a broader 
compromise across different groups of actors interested in holding managers accountable for the 
social and environmental impact of large corporations. By looking at sustainable finance in isolation, 
the regulator risks building weak mechanisms of sustainable corporate governance.64 Responsible 
investors have limited influence on executives and regulators as compared to a broader coalition of 
actors. Furthermore, they are interested in social and environmental issues that also affect 
corporate financial performance. This excludes many important aspects of ‘strong’ sustainability. 
Finally, even the EU High Level Group (HLEG) on Sustainable Finance warned that excessive 
emphasis on financial market incentives to improve the environment and deliver social benefits may 
create a ‘green bubble’ and market distortions.65  
Rather than taking a zero-sum regulatory approach that privileges investors over other social and 
economic constituencies, such as organized labour and civil society, policy-makers should promote 
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synergies between providers of sustainable financial services and other regulatory intermediaries,66 
such as NGOs and unions. Investors, NGOs and unions have different means to directly and indirectly 
influence corporations. However, in isolation they have limited capabilities and influence. By joining 
forces, they can better perform crucial regulatory roles, such as agenda setting, implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement. 
Further, policymakers should be sceptical of the win-win rhetoric that characterizes both green 
finance and multi-stakeholder ideals. Both views are overly optimistic about the possibility that, in 
the long-run, sustainability policies will ultimately create shared value or benefit all stakeholders. As 
discussed in section 2, the current policy debate tends to deny conflicts and trade-offs. Instead of 
considering conflicts as negative, policymakers should acknowledge them and the need for balancing 
opposed forces as the engine for finding a stronger sustainable corporate compromise. The 
approach taken by this study suggests that conflicts can help to form rules and norms. Our data 
show that the compromise amongst investors, NGOs and unions is constructed against the 
discretionary power of corporate executives. These three groups of actors have different 
worldviews, interests and even terminologies to define corporate sustainability. However, they can 
be united by the common objective of holding corporations more effectively accountable for 
financial, environmental and social risks. In addition, the differences, tensions and even contrasts 
that exist within the NIU nexus can enrich the corporate governance and sustainability debate. Thus, 
regulators should pay more attention to conflicts as positive social forces to advance new regulatory 
solutions and a stronger framework for corporate sustainability.  
Overall, policymakers should pursue a more pragmatic and processual approach to sustainable 
corporate governance. In contrast with abstract shareholder-oriented and multi-stakeholder models, 
the NIU alignment of interests that I discuss through this study is a contextualized compromise. It 
emerged from existing conditions and institutional settings that are present today in Europe, but not 
necessarily elsewhere, and that are subject to change over time. It also reflects the relative power of 
the actors involved in struggles for changing EU and Member States’ corporate governance 
regulation. Therefore, it is worth highlighting here some scope conditions without which NIU 
corporate governance compromises could not emerge.  
First, developed financial markets are a precondition for a dynamic responsible investor movement 
and an NIU nexus to emerge. ESG analysts and green finance are a luxury for countries where stock 
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markets and financial services are underdeveloped. This condition concerns for instance most 
Eastern European countries and, until recently, most Continental European jurisdictions. In fact, until 
a decade ago, in Europe a relatively strong presence of responsible investors was mainly limited to 
the UK. Ever since, responsible investments have experienced a remarkable growth - in the UK but 
also in other EU countries.67 This growth helps explain the emergence of NIU compromises. 
Second, NIU compromises require the presence of relatively well-organised NGOs and unions that 
have the organizational capabilities to exert their influence on both policy-makers and corporations. 
As for the relative power of unions in the EU policy arena, this varies across Member States and it 
has been generally declining. However, the European context is still characterised by the strong 
presence of organized labour and its institutional recognition through various forms of collective 
bargaining and social dialogue. This differs from other contexts such as the US.68 As for NGOs, in 
Europe organized civil society struggles to match the capacity of business to influence public 
authorities and the regulatory process. Nonetheless, it is also relatively strong as compared to other 
regions and, in recent years, European NGO networks have also become more coordinated, 
developing a stronger capacity to influence EU as well as Member States policies. Again, the relative 
power of unions and NGOs is unevenly distributed across Europe and this also explains the 
emergence of a variety of NIU compromises.  
Finally, the support of policy-makers is crucial for the emergence of NIU compromises. Specifically, 
the study illustrates that the NIU nexus has emerged where and when policy-makers became more 
interventionist in the economy, backing a shift away from purely voluntary corporate sustainability 
policies. This means that they overcame the conventional business-centred approach to corporate 
governance that underpins both shareholder-oriented and multi-stakeholder models. By looking for 
pragmatic corporate accountability solutions supported by stronger and larger coalitions, public 
authorities have facilitated the formation of NIU compromises.  NIU coalitions are never purely 
market-driven. They are politically orchestrated and motivated bargains between actors that have 
(often sharply) different values and worldviews about sustainability but share a common interest in 
holding executives accountable.  
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6. Conclusions: Scepticism and hope for strong corporate sustainability  
As Andrew Johnston argues in this volume in the UK context, at the moment ‘the best that can be 
hoped for is a degree of ‘weak’ sustainability’.69 Admittedly, there is a considerable gap between the 
limitations and shortcomings of the sustainable corporate governance reforms that have been the 
object of this study and the need for a ‘strong’ approach to corporate sustainability.70 For instance, 
Ahern has criticized the EU Directive maintaining that its ‘non-prescriptive approach to the reporting 
framework negates the possibility of a uniform approach being taken to sustainability reporting by 
companies within the EU. As a knock-on consequence, the ability to engage in meaningful cross-
company comparisons by stakeholders is likely to be significantly hampered.’71 Similarly, others have 
harshly criticized the limitations and weaknesses of the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act.72 The lack of a 
clear and meaningful framework for disclosure, adequate sanctions and enforcement mechanisms 
led to widespread non-compliance and a ‘suspicious uniformity’ among statements.73  
Keeping in mind this sobering picture, rather than restating these shortcomings, this chapter has 
shifted attention from the individual reforms to the coalitions that are driving them. This is not to 
offer easy solutions to ‘strong’ sustainability but rather a more processual, dynamic and contested 
approach to overcome the current ‘weak’ corporate sustainability paradigm. Deploying this 
perspective can offer some reasons for hope as well as legitimate scepticism about the actual 
possibility of NIU compromises to advance strong sustainability. The main point remains that any 
progress will be – as always – the result of social struggles and political compromises.  
Specifically, the emergence of a stronger corporate sustainability compromise through the NIU 
coalitions can contribute to address two deadlocks that hinder stronger corporate sustainability 
reforms.  
First, the current debate is very narrow and technical, looking at transparency as an end in itself. 
What is missing is not only a better sustainability accounting framework but a public and democratic 
debate about corporate accountability. The emergence of a broader societal alignment amongst 
responsible investors, NGOs and unions can help to create this broader public debate.   
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Second, stronger corporate sustainability legislation has been successfully resisted by framing it as 
‘red tape’ and ‘anti-business’. The emergence of the NIU nexus allows overcoming the business-civil 
society divide.  The most significant challenge in advancing ‘strong’ sustainability is how to balance 
the current discretionary power of global corporations. By empowering these social constituencies 
that have some leverage on corporate conduct, policymakers can orchestrate a more effective 
monitoring and enforcement regime for corporate sustainability.  
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Appendix. List of interviews 
# ORGANISATION DATE # ORGANISATION DATE 
1 EU Commission 22/04/2010 21 Sustainalytics  23/06/2016 
2 EU Commission 30/04/2010 22 WHEB   14/07/2016 
3 Global Reporting Initiative 08/04/2011 23 Oekom  14/07/2016 
4 SOMO  15/04/2011 24 SRI expert 19/07/2016 
5 Aegon Asset Management  02/06/2011 25 MSCI  14/09/2016 
6 APG  06/06/2011 26 ECCJ  16/10/2016 
7 ETUI 08/06/2011   27 ChristianAid  11/10/2016 
8 ETUC 15/06/2011 28 Frank Bold 17/10/2016 
9 ECCJ  17/06/2011 29 EU Commission  25/10/2016 
10 EU Commission 26/06/2012 30 EUROSIF  05/12/2016  
11 EU Commission 23/07/2012 31 CORE Coalition  15/05/2017 
12 EU Commission 25/07/2012 32 EU Commission  03/04/2017 
13 EU Commission 30/07/2012 33 SpainSIF  21/04/2017 
14 EU Commission 08/08/2012 34 CDSE  05/04/2017 
15 SRI expert  07/09/2012 35 FIR  02/05/2017 
16 ETUC 02/11/2012 36 Trade Union Confederation 12/04/2017 
17 EU Commission 03/11/2012 37 ERIN/ShareAction  20/04/2017 
18 EUROSIF  22/01/2013 38 ETUC 08/05/2017 
19 Transparency International  24/01/2013 39 EU Commission  10/05/2017 
20 CSR regulation expert 01/03/2013 40 ShareAction  10/05/2017 
   41 VBDO  16/05/2017 
   42 Business and Human Rights expert 19/05/2017 
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